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Abstract 
 This paper examines the process of gentrification by analyzing the actors implicated in 
gentrification, the global and domestic discourses surrounding redevelopment, and the political 
motivations undergirding such projects in the context of the Cheonggyecheon Restoration 
Project. It takes a critical stance towards the South Korean government’s pursuit of 
redevelopment projects with the goal of generating “world-class” spaces favoring the interests of 
large corporate entities, with which it has established economic ties constituting a conflict of 
interest. Consequences of these gentrifying practices include the displacement of local 
merchants, communities, and cultural spaces, which further stratify already disparate levels of 
privilege within the country’s political economy.  
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Introduction 
Foul pollution, traffic hell, back-breaking housing prices, brutal 
rivalry and unruly streets—this is the Seoul we think of today. 
Now close your eyes and envision the future of Seoul. Citizens are 
relaxing by a stream; happy crowds mingle as music plays all night 
long, and young couples wish for love as they toss coins into the 
water. This no longer will be merely an imagination but will come 
to reality starting this year. A city of romance and festivals will be 
born out of the previous pollution and traffic—all thanks to the Lee 
Myung-Bak Projects!  1
This article, written five months before the initiation of the Cheonggyecheon 
reconstruction project, reflects a common sentiment in South Korea. The project received an 
overwhelming 79. 1 percent approval rating amongst the residents of Seoul. The quick execution 
of the plan earned Mayor Lee Myung-bak further praise once the project was over, and 
eventually he was able to leverage this result to earn the South Korean presidency in 2008.  The 2
project received international attention as an example of successful urban regeneration. The New 
York Times described Cheonggyecheon as a “gathering place…[that] taps into a growing 
national emphasis on quality of life and immediately makes the mayor a top presidential 
contender.”  Times magazine ranked the Cheonggyecheon Stream as number seven in places to 3
visit in Korea.  The Landscape Architecture Foundation wrote that the project led an “important 4
paradigm shift, changing from an auto-centric development-oriented urban landscape to one that 
values the quality of life of its people and the importance of functioning ecosystems.”  5
The Cheonggyecheon restoration project was undeniably crucial to the economic 
revitalization and changing image of downtown Seoul. However, such reviews often lack a 
comprehensive analysis of outcomes, actors, and methods that paint a more complicated picture 
than the narrative of a newly born “clean and attractive global Seoul.”  Although the mainstream 6
media may portray the project as a boon for the general population of Seoul, a more in-depth 
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study reveals the gentrifying processes in which the Seoul city government drives the 
Cheonggyecheon project. This project of gentrification manifests the motivations of a country 
executing a late and rapid entrance into industrialization and the global sphere, and willing to go 
to long measures to fulfill its goals, including suppressing labor and perpetuating exclusionary 
political and social relations. 
Previous literature has primarily used the framework of urban regeneration to understand 
the Cheonggyecheon restoration project. Urban regeneration and gentrification are similar terms 
in that they conceptualize the same phenomenon. They both study the process in which residents 
are displaced to create spaces that serve and attract wealthier subjects. However, the two terms 
differ as frameworks of analysis, in that gentrification examines the socio-political relations 
between the displaced and displacer, while urban regeneration solely focuses on the displacer. 
Urban regeneration is becoming more common now that open spaces are presumed to 
appeal to a “creative class” that is essential to urban maturation in developing economies.  In the 7
past, the main dispossessors during gentrification have been households reacting to market 
incentives, or the “rent-gap.”  However, according to Hackworth, larger, corporate interests are 8
entering real estate and, as a consequence, displacing “lower” commercial activities and lower 
income households.  Not only does Hackworth contend that gentrification is no longer only a 9
market-induced phenomenon, but that government intervention has also joined in gentrifying 
efforts in order to combat deindustrialization.  
The Cheonggyecheon restoration project is useful when discussing the evolution of urban 
regeneration because, in this case, the state intervenes in order to prioritize the interests of the 
free market. This paper will analyze who the actors involved in gentrification are, how this 
process is facilitated and justified, and how different social groups experience gentrification. In 
doing so, this paper will take a critical stance on development-induced urban projects and argue 
that the Cheonggyecheon project is emblematic of a world-wide phenomenon in which the poor 
are displaced in the name of development.  
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Industrialization, Development Discourse, and Political Motivations 
In order to understand what the previous inhabitants of Cheonggyecheon have exactly 
been dispossessed of, a study of this project through the lens of gentrification must understand 
what the Cheonggyecheon stream was like before its regeneration. Cheonggyecheon used to be 
an 11-km stream that ran through downtown Seoul until the rapid industrialization during the 
1950s, when the entire stream was covered with a road and the elevated Cheonggye Expressway 
to foster the growth of industrial and residential areas in Eastern Seoul. Gradually, wholesale 
markets, small stores, street restaurants, vendors, and bars settled down along the expressway 
and into the slim alleys of close neighborhoods.  By the 1980s, this particular scene did not 10
settle right with the metropolitan government. Downtown Seoul was the only area in the city 
with a declining population, and bulyang jutaeks, or substandard housing types, (mostly rentals 
or squatters) composed 35 percent of downtown housing, a proportion that was 2.5 times the 
average of Seoul. Most of the people leaving were in their 20s or 30s, and the number of 
businesses and enterprises in the downtown area had declined by 24.1 percent from 1991 to 
2000.  In simpler terms, downtown Seoul was not “developed” enough, especially compared to 11
the rest of the city, and the metropolitan government was determined to revitalize the area.  
Thus, the Cheonggyecheon restoration project certainly was not the first to introduce 
‘development’ as the ideal. The metropolitan government had been making small scale 
regeneration efforts prior to the Cheonggyecheon restoration project—improving rundown 
houses, expanding roads and refining infrastructure in small dilapidated neighborhoods with poor 
traffic conditions. Yet such minute operations were not enough to transform Seoul into a central 
business district as long as the 18-lane elevated highway was still present.  It was not until Lee 12
Myung-bak, with ambitious career goals and a detailed plan on how to reach them in mind, 
arrived with the Cheonggyecheon restoration project when downtown Seoul underwent drastic 
change. 
  By liquidating the unsightly legacy from Korea’s developmental 
period and restoring the city’s natural environment, Seoul can be 
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ready to emerge as a cultural metropolis where tradition and 
modernity are harmoniously blended with each other. 
  - Lee Myung-bak  13
Ever since South Korea became its own country in 1948, efforts toward ‘development’ 
have largely gone uncontested. This allowed for the development of infrastructure, numerous 
mega-conglomerates, called chaebol, to thrive, national GDP to soar; the country had even 
hosted what is arguably the biggest international event to ever exist, the Olympics, in 1988. 
‘Development’ is not only a constant theme in South Korean history but is also a rhetorical 
device deployed to justify gentrification projects worldwide. After all, a common synonym for 
urban regeneration projects is urban redevelopment projects. But what exactly is development, 
and what does it look like? And how has the image of development changed in South Korea 
since the days of rapid economic growth led by military dictators in the 1970s and 80s?  
Before delving into how the project was carried out, one must recognize the specific 
vision of development Lee Myung-bak had in mind. First, he distances the new and refurbished 
Seoul from that of the “unsightly” developmental period by “liquidating” its “legacy.” Hence, the 
city must hold a certain aesthetic that is more advanced than that of crude industrialization. He 
focuses on “modernity,” a term that refers to an ambiguous global standard, but is also concerned 
with “tradition,” which indicates a nationalistic appeal to the Korean ethnicity. With the phrase 
“cultural metropolis,” he paints the picture of a city full of vibrancy with a healthy economy. 
This is only one dimension of the city, however, since it must also contain a “natural 
environment,” an ecological appeal, as well. Under the pretext that this new scene will help 
“national growth,” the Seoul city government meticulously advertised a very curated image of 
Seoul to the global stage. 
Execution of the Project 
Once Lee Myung-bak won the 2002 Seoul mayoral election with 52.28 percent of the 
votes, the Cheonggyecheon projects commenced less than a month later on July 1, 2002 and 
lasted until 2006. Lee Myung-bak formed three groups—the Cheonggyecheon restoration 
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headquarters, Cheonggyecheon research group, Cheonggyecheon citizens’ committee—to 
manage research proceedings regarding the restoration, generate plans, and organize structural 
processes. Each group consisted of government officials, experts, and citizens. This triangular 
structure was specifically designed to simultaneously launch implementation whilst building 
public relations. Efficiency was especially considered an important component of the process and 
the three departments congregated every Saturday for a meeting in which they made decisions in 
a “speedy and determined manner.” A development plan concerning strategy for downtown 
development, revival of downtown industries, and the Cheonggyecheon neighborhood were 
announced in June 2003. A year later, the Cheonggyecheon restoration headquarters presented a 
master plan that specified how to revitalize Cheonggyecheon’s natural environment in order to 
design a more “human-oriented public space” and how to return the stream, acquire water 
resources, manage sewage, traffic and historical assets.  14
The process was incredibly fast-paced. In fact, much of the planning and construction 
stages overlapped. The manufacturing of the Cheonggyecheon stream did not happen in an 
orderly, linear fashion. Construction began only six months after the government had started 
working on the “Cheonggyecheon Restoration Master Plan” even though it was not until a year 
later when the plan was finalized. To give a point of reference, the Big Dig city regeneration 
project in Boston, Massachusetts that covered 12 km took 25 years. The High Line project in 
New York City, which covered 1.6 km, took 9 years. The Cheonggyecheon project, which 
covered 5.8 km, was completed in just 27 months. The construction process was hurried in order 
to minimize business disruption and financial loss for the merchants and property owners in 
Cheonggyecheon, but Lee Myung-bak was also eager to complete the project before his term as 
the Seoul mayor was over.   15
The metropolitan government wanted Cheonggyecheon to be recognized as a public 
project, thus it accumulated $84.13 million from what was supposed to be the Cheonggye 
elevated highway renovation, another $84.47 million pulled from other city programs, and the 
rest from tax money to secure a total government budget of $323 million.  The financing of the 16
Cheonggyecheon restoration project depended on the “ripple effect” as well.  Once the public 17
sector was able to build a “better” urban environment, the private sector was presumed to follow 
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in regeneration efforts. The private and public sector then would work in partnership to continue 
“urban regeneration.” With an elevated highway, an “eco-friendly” waterfront, and the stream, 
Cheonggyecheon first opened to the public in September 2005.  18
Under the developmental state, Korea derived its zeal for urban reconstruction from the 
“great works of nation building and social transformation.”  The use of urban renewal and city 19
marketing to enhance economic competitiveness and international attraction in Seoul had always 
been a topic of interest for the metropolitan government since industrialization. The goal was to 
develop Seoul into a “sustainable, livable, and global city” through strategic management and 
marketing of its resources for eventual economic growth and urbanization. Cheonggyecheon was 
pivotal for Seoul’s envisioned future as a “world-class city.”  20
A key feature of a model city in the minds of the metropolitan government today is one 
that can compete at a global level. Indeed, Lee Myung-bak stated that Seoul must “stand out as a 
center of foreign investment...as an attractive center of business along with Shanghai, Tokyo, and 
Beijing.”  According to Kriznik, global pressures mounted especially high on Seoul, who was 21
late to urbanization and was, for a long time, a “wannabe world city” eager to prove itself.  It 22
had “most to gain—in status, power, and wealth—from its worldview.”  With the advent of 23
globalization, cultures and politics across nations became increasingly intertwined and cities rose 
as centers of global flows of culture, capital, and goods. Yet Kriznik argues that cities were not 
just spaces for globalization to unfold, but “engines of the global economy and reproduced the 
global order as much as they were affected by it.”  In other words, globalization is about 24
increased local control as well. The Cheonggyecheon project epitomizes a new phase of 
developmentalism, one that is intensified by policies reminiscent of Kim Young Sam’s 
Segwehwa, where globalization meets ethnic nationalism and a very specific image of Seoul is 
marketed to the world. In the context of globalization, the ability to attract foreign investment 
became critical for economic growth and urban development. This phenomenon incentivizes 
governments to invest substantial financial resources and enact administrative initiatives in their 
urban policies in order to create social change. In response to these trends, in 1995, the Seoul 
metropolitan government took a central role in local economic growth and urban development. It 
also increased the marketing budget by 750% in 2008.  25
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The hope that the global status of Seoul could be altered by the determined management 
and marketing of its resources often overshadows the negative outcomes of urban development, 
such as uneven capital accumulation and social segregation. For example, sustainability is 
considered one of the “normative principles in urban design, assuring attractiveness in the city 
government.”  However, while green urbanism has been advocating the ethics of zero-emissions 26
and zero-waste, a precise definition for sustainable urban design has not been reached. In fact, 
Scheutze et al. states that over 200 different definitions for sustainable urban development exists, 
which makes it difficult to comprehend urban sustainability beyond energy efficiency and 
aesthetics. Thus, city governments have not paid adequate attention to how to apply urban 
sustainability across various societal groups and invest in the “social responsibility and 
economical aspects on different levels of urban scales.” Especially in the case of the 
Cheonggyecheon project, which took an alarmingly short period of time to construct, one can 
only imagine how much attention was devoted to social and ecological responsibility. 
In spite of the arbitrary nature of the standards used to judge cities, a space had already 
formed in which governments challenged established relations amongst cities through the 
“worlding practice,” or making their cities more “world-class.”  In 2005, OECD described the 27
restoration as one that “can serve as a flagship project showing to the international community 
Seoul’s dedication in building a lively urban landscape. If the project is closely connected to a 
cultural booming, it could become a major touristic asset for Seoul’s international image.”  28
Furthermore, the foreign media commended the project for successfully transforming previous 
international perception of Seoul as an “urban concrete jungle.”  These sources legitimized the 29
city government’s undertaking of urban regeneration, furthering emboldening their efforts to 
achieve importance within the global competitive order. 
Politics of Redevelopment, Corruption, and Public Reception 
Despite the constant rhetoric about “national growth,” and the betterment of Seoul, Lee 
Myung-bak had much to gain privately from this project. Enabled by the top-down structure of 
the Cheonggyecheon project, Lee Myung bak was able to aggressively push the project through 
and skillfully advertise his project in a way to further his professional career. When Lee Myung-
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bak pledged during his 2002 Seoul mayoral election campaign that he would reconstruct the 
Cheonggyecheon stream, it immediately became the central question of the election, thus, 
allowing the project to have salient connections to the election and politics. The opposing 
mayoral candidate called for protecting neighboring merchants and commercial property owners 
from business interruptions. They argued that the project not only did not have a feasible 
infrastructure plan but would cause further traffic congestion and cost the city an additional $446 
million, and that funds be spent on more pressing issues, such as education. On the other hand, 
Lee Myung-bak argued that the highway was run-down and unstable, that the project would help 
resuscitate the downtown economy, and transform Seoul’s image to that of a dynamic and 
emerging global metropolis.  30
In spite of Lee Myung-bak’s rhetorical emphasis of this being a public project for the 
general betterment of Seoul’s citizens, hints of cronyism, corruption and personal advancement 
were apparent in the Cheonggyecheon reconstruction project. Once Lee Myung-bak was elected 
and initiated the project, he hired contractors who had been active in the bidding process in favor 
of the project. Cheonggyecheon was divided into sections in which various private developers, 
including Daelim Industrial Corporation, LG Engineering and Construction Corporation, 
Hyundai Engineering, and Construction Corporation, undertook responsibility for 
development.  It is notable that the direct beneficiaries of this $300 million project were 31
massive conglomerates. Namely, Hyundai Engineering and Construction Corporation, which was 
responsible for one of the main sections of Cheonggyecheon, was the same company that Lee 
Myung-bak himself had worked for, and eventually became CEO of, from 1967-1992.  It is not 32
a coincidence that these particular conglomerates were delegated parts of the reconstruction 
project. Yet again in South Korea, a project set up in the name of development, 
disproportionately benefited conglomerates over the local markets and vendors that had existed 
there originally. Lee Myung-bak’s own previous position as the CEO of Hyundai Engineering 
and Construction Corporation, and subsequent economic opportunities he gifted to the company 
as mayor, do not suggest the usual corporate-state link, but that, in South Korea, the line has truly 
blurred between the two entities. Perhaps the reason why the reconstruction project was able to 
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be carried out so quickly, and all dissenting opinions suppressed so easily, was that corporations 
and the government were able to literally act together, as one and the same.  
A particularly controversial case of cronyism arose when Vice-Mayor Yang Yoon-jae, 
who was once a professor at Seoul National University’s Graduate School of Environmental 
Studies and director of the project from 2002 to 2004, was arrested for accepting over $100,000 
worth of bribes from a developer to relax height restrictions on the Cheonggyecheon 
Expressway. Although he was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison, Lee Myung-
bak, his former boss and who had been elected President by this time, not only pardoned him but 
also designated him as Presidential Commission on Architecture Policy.  33
One of the biggest reasons the Cheonggyecheon project was able to happen so smoothly 
was that much of the project budget was devoted to marketing. One cannot help but wonder what 
Lee Myung-bak cared about more: the project or people’s opinion of the project. It was important 
for Lee Myung-bak that the project served its purpose: to publicize the project and his own 
competency and kick-start his own campaign for presidency. In order to make known the success 
of the project, Lee Myung-bak devoted 1 billion won (approximately 959,000 US dollars) on 
numerous public relations programs related to the stream. With these finances, Lee Myung-bak 
instituted the Cheonggyecheon Revival Academy in the early 2000s to “inform public opinion” 
regarding the project, in an attempt to build, or at least feign, social consensus on the project. Lee 
Myung-bak did not stop with the South Korean media but made his debut into the global scene 
as well. On May 2004, Lee Myung-bak offered 390,000,000 won (approximately 374,000 US 
dollars) to the US documentary channel, “Discovery,” to produce an episode on 
Cheonggyecheon, including an extensive interview with Lee Myung-bak. He has also expended 
600,000,000 won (approximately 575,400 US dollars) on a project called “Cheonggyecheon 
Video White Paper” using Seoul citizens’ tax money and hosted a symposium in which he 
invited infrastructure and environmental experts to speak about the Cheonggyecheon restoration 
project.  34
Thus, with the support of government officials, government research institutions, and 
civic engineers, Mayor Lee pushed for swift reconstruction with wide political support and 
positive media coverage. The rapid and relentless fashion in which the restoration process was 
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conducted was supposed to reflect his “management competence” and strong political stance.  35
However, multiple civic, academic, environmental, and cultural organizations have questioned 
the “ecological and historical authenticity” of the stream and voiced protest on what they viewed 
as an undemocratic operation.  For example, an important aspect of Cheonggyecheon’s appeal is 36
its environmental friendliness. However, because the city government had chosen a nearby 
water-treatment facility for water supply instead of a long-term gradual restoration of natural 
water inflow, an increasingly serious algae problem had developed in the stream. Moreover, the 
bottom of the stream, which is made of concrete, renders it almost impossible to conduct 
purification purposes, and maintenance expenses have been climbing by 30 percent annually.  37
Despite Mayor Lee’s claim to have built a modernized Seoul that is still in touch with its unique 
cultural heritage, not only has the project itself destroyed numerous historical and cultural sites, 
but his previous company, Hyundai Engineering and Construction Corporation, was also 
responsible for much of the environmental degradation during the period of rapid 
industrialization in 1960s and 1970s.  38
Gentrification 
The case of the Cheonggyecheon restoration project offers two important facts 
concerning gentrification: that displacement is ongoing, and that the displaced does not just 
include lower income households, but lower industrial uses as well.  
Despite Lee Myung-bak’s determined PR efforts to gain approval for the restoration 
project, the restoration plan was extended from the initial 10 months to 2 years due to trouble 
building social consensus amongst all civil groups.  Vehement and active protests, albeit 39
ultimately drowned out in an authoritarian fashion, are evidence that the gentrifying practices 
prompted by the Cheonggyecheon restoration project were, in fact, exclusionary. Perhaps the 
protests against the Cheonggyecheon project were not met with the dramatic and violent 
silencing tactics from the 70s and 80s, when the police could openly beat demonstrators to death 
in the streets, but the government under Lee Myung-bak was oppressive nonetheless. Any dissent 
was ignored when the project was being pushed through, and when the land prices became too 
high for the previous residents, they were forced to relocate. Impacts and outcomes of the project 
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indicate that certain social classes were prevented from enjoying the benefits of the newly 
constructed stream, solidifying a widening gap in power relations between the dispossessor and 
the dispossessed.  
Prior to the restoration project, Cheonggyecheon constituted a very vibrant community, 
with social and political complexities. Pollution and noise from the elevated Cheonggye 
expressway formed an amicable setting for small firms and trophy, metalworking and printing 
industry clusters to develop in surrounding areas. Small plots and lower buildings conserved the 
narrow alleys and historical sites, while lower-income workers, merchants, customers and illegal 
vendors populated the downtown area every day and built their livelihoods around it.  The area 40
had, after four decades, nourished local cultures and businesses, and “woven into the fabric of 
the city.”  41
Thus, merchants lead the opposition against the project. City officials and merchants held 
approximately 4,200 meetings, yet the merchants still emerged from the process as a deeply 
disadvantaged party. The government gave no direct compensation for business interruptions or 
relocation, and moved street vendors to the Dongdaemun stadium close by with the promise of 
renovating the flea market area.  However, not only did this promise fail to deliver and business 42
wane, but the stadium itself was also demolished in the name of “urban regeneration” a year later 
under the next Seoul mayor, Oh Se-hoon. The street vendors were moved once again, this time to 
a folk market in sinseoldong.  As opposed to recognizing that the Cheonggyecheon 43
reconstruction project has disempowered certain groups, the project has only incited more 
excitement about urban regeneration projects, and about development. Compared to the success 
story of a renovated city and a tenacious man, and the glowing international reception the project 
received, the story that the previous residents of downtown Seoul have to tell is harsh and 
unpromising.  
The purported goals of the Cheonggyecheon reconstruction project were the following: 
decrease the disparity between northern and downtown Seoul by improving environmental and 
living conditions in the latter, reclaiming natural and cultural heritage that had been destroyed 
during rapid urbanization, form new public spaces, and increase traffic safety. In some ways, the 
Cheonggyecheon project was a success. The Cheonggyecheon stream has hosted 259 cultural 
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events from 2005 to 2007, and in a 2014 public survey, 59.6 percent of the respondents described 
it as a pleasant place to relax. Hence the Cheonggyecheon is generally perceived to have 44
enhanced accessibility to conveniences, yet this does not apply for everyone.  
Through the project, the Seoul Metropolitan Government hoped to expand business 
services and commercial cluster in the area. Such transformations entailed increase land rents 
and property values. In fact, on account of the reconstruction, land prices increased from 35 to 80 
percent depending on the proximity to the stream, and office rents increased by 20 percent.  45
Consequently, neighborhoods like Sinseoul, Hwanghak and Wangsimni became districts of land 
speculation. High-rise office buildings and residential projects grew along Cheonggyecheon in 
replacement of small workshops and businesses.  19 percent of the economy used to consist of 46
manufacturing, while another 32 percent was wholesale, retail, and transportation business.  47
However, the project drove out traditional industrial sectors in order to give rise to financial and 
professional services. By 2011, 98% of the land use changes along the reconstruction districts 
constituted hotel, commercial, office or educational institutes.  Almost half of all 168 land uses 48
changes were commercial, including cafes, restaurants, bars, and retail, while approximately 
quarter of them were for office utilities and only 8 cases, or 4.7 percent, were industrial.  Before 49
the project, there were about 60,000 shops that employed a total of 800,000 workers and illegal 
street vendors. The Cheonggyecheon flea market, along with the Hwanghak market, essentially 
vanished after the reconstruction, and only 700 street vendors were left in the Seoul folk flea 
market by 2011.  In other words, reproduction of local economy and day-to-day life perished to 50
be replaced by structures of private urban development. In fact, Lim et al. argues that 
entrepreneurial cities purposefully escalated property tax revenues to compensate for the lack of 
state funding.  Under commercial gentrification, government intervention in refurbishing 51
neighborhoods had become “conscious, active, intentional, and even a source of pride.”  52
The structural changes the project enacted in the economy demonstrate the importance of 
spatial capital. A survey in Wangsimni, a low-income neighborhood nearby Cheonggyecheon, 
was conducted in 2008 about the stream. 69 percent of the respondents reported that they often 
spent their free time in the neighborhood, but 33 percent of the respondents said that they never 
or seldom visited the stream and complained that the neighborhood lacked available public 
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space. When asked why, they explained that they did not consider Cheonggyecheon as “their 
place.” In fact, reports show that Cheonggyecheon is mostly enjoyed by foreign visitors and 
visitors from other parts of Seoul.  The “privileged consumption practices” of other visitors is 53
an act of “social power over the everyday use and meaning of space.”  The creation of the 54
Cheonggyecheon stream has “created a new sense of order for some local residents,” effectively 
spreading a sense of alienation amongst those who were left behind in the process. Moreover, 
only 6% of the respondents stated that the reconstruction boosted economic development in the 
neighborhood, suggesting that a very small proportion of the local population, if any, had access 
to the economic benefits of reconstruction in their own living environment.  The inequitable 55
outcomes of the Cheonggyecheon stream imply that this is a case of authoritative social and 
political actors enforcing their arbitrary understandings of urban renewal, whether or not it is 
meaningful to the already existing societies.  
Based on the reception Cheonggyecheon has received, swift redevelopment for the 
“higher uses” is considered a successful instance of urban regeneration. Such general perception 
suggests which stakeholders are more valued not only by the city government, but by civil 
society. As displacement continues, a civil society that increasingly caters to bourgeoisie middle-
class interests has emerged. As a result, the urban poor, who are most in need of income-
generating opportunities, are pushed away from “central sources of income,” and from “civic life 
and urban culture, and were seen as impediment to progress and betterment of society.”  56
Conclusion 
Continually chased by the workings of the global free market, and its agent, the state, the 
urban poor are transformed into nomads, or “transients in a perpetual state of relocation.”  The 57
Cheonggyecheon restoration project not only sparked long languishing redevelopment projects, 
but also incited new ones. While no redevelopment projects were issued permits from 1990 to 
2005, within two years of the stream’s public opening, eight redevelopment projects that had 
been inactive since the mid 1970s were issued permits. Hence developmentalism is still present, 
possibly even strengthened, under the world’s current political-economic climate. Despite the 
narratives of Seoul as a cultural, environmental, and “international hub of world capitalist 
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production and exchange,”  this paper argues that such top-down “scientific social planning” 58
simply does not work. Communities are not designed to be dislodged and transported. Urban 
regeneration does not give rise to nation-wide growth, but instead further creates “spatial 
barriers, residential privileges, zoning, and other planning mechanisms where income, position, 
and clout determined access” to wealth.  Furthermore, the Cheonggyecheon restoration project 59
sheds insight into the hypocrisy and contradictions of Korean politics. The personal benefits Lee 
Myung-bak reaped from the Cheonggyecheon reconstruction project indicate that urban 
regeneration efforts strategically legitimize the elite political and corporate groups’ particular 
interpretations of urban renewal. Neglect of the demolition of traditional markets and local 
places, dislocation of lower-income neighborhoods, and isolation amongst local residents erases 
the memory of city exploitation, and perpetuates gentrification as embodying the new “global 
urban strategy.”   60
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